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HUMAN RIGHTSQUARTERLY

Oppositionto HumanRightsTreatiesin
the United States Senate:The Legacyof
the BrickerAmendment
Natalie Hevener Kaufmanand David Whiteman*
is to burythe so-calledcovenant
Mypurposein offeringthisresolution
on humanrightsso deep thatno one holdinghighpublicofficewill
everdareto attemptits resurrection.'
SenatorJohnBricker
1951
(R-Ohio),
As we consider the status of the human rightscovenants today, it would
appearthatthe ghostof SenatorJohnBrickermustbe smilingatthe fulfillment
of his wish. Thirtyyears after the defeat of the BrickerAmendment,the
covenants and most other majorhuman rightstreatieshave yet to receive
Senate approval.2 Duringthe same period,these covenants have been ratified by eighty-fiveother nations, includingfifteen Westerndemocracies.3
The questionwhich deservesour attentionis why the UnitedStateshas not
ratifiedthese treatiesas well. The United Stateshas long considered itself
the leading protectorof human rights.ManyAmericansconsiderthe Declarationof Independenceand its referencesto "inalienablerights"to be the
source of reintroductionof basic human rights into the modern political
*We would like to thankLouisSohn, JerelRosati,and Paul GordonLaurenfor theirhelpful
commentson this article.
1. CongressionalRecord.82nd Cong., 1st sess., 1951. Vol. 97, pt. 8, 8263.
2. Some human rightstreatieshave been ratified.Two treatiesfrom the early 1950s, the
Conventionon the
Conventionon the PoliticalRightsof Womenand the Inter-American
Grantingof PoliticalRightsto Women,were ratifiedin 1975. In 1968, the Senateratified
the Supplementary
SlaveryConvention,which extendedthe 1926 SlaveryConventionand
its Protocol.Some scholarswould also include the four Geneva Protocolswhich cover
wartimeconditionsand the Protocolon the Statusof Refugees.
3. United Nations,MultilateralTreatiesDepositedwith the SecretaryGeneral:Statusas of
31 December1986 (New York:UnitedNations,1986). Westerndemocraciesratifyingthe
covenantsare:Australia,Austria,Canada,Denmark,Finland,France,the FederalRepublic
of Germany,Iceland,Italy,the Netherlands,Norway,Portugal,Spain,Sweden, and the
UnitedKingdom.
HumanRightsQuarterly10 (1988) 309-337 o 1988 by The JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress
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scene. Most Americansbelieve that the United States has the best record
on human rightsof any countryin the world. When these treatiesappear
to reflectthe highest ideals of the Americanpeople, and when our allies
and otherdemocracieshave been able to reconciletheirpoliticaland legal
systems with the obligationsof the treaties,why is the United Statesstill
unableto do so?
The purposeof this analysisis to explore in a systematicfashion(1) the
originaldevelopmentof argumentsin oppositionto humanrightstreatiesin
the UnitedStatesSenateand (2) the residualstrengthof these argumentsin
contemporarydeliberations.We base our findingson legal analysis,legislative histories,content analysisof congressionalhearings,and interviews
withcongressionalstaffmembers.Ourmainconclusionsarethatproponents
of the BrickerAmendmentwere primarilyconcerned with human rights
treaties,thatcontemporaryargumentsagainstpassageof humanrightstreaties have not changedsubstantiallyfromargumentspresentedin the 1950s,
andthatthe legacyof theseearlierdeliberationsis stillapparentin the attitude
of those consideringthe treatiesnow.
Certainly,given the politicalenvironmentof the 1950s, some suspicion
of human rightstreaties might have been expected. Two aspects of the
environmentwere particularlysalient:the movementtowardracialintegration and the Cold War.The integrationof Americantroops abroadduring
WorldWardIIandthe establishmentof a wartimeFairEmploymentPractices
Commissionwere small steps which signalledthe clear possibilityof impendingfederalaction to eliminateracialdiscrimination.The reportof the
TrumanCommissionon Civil Rightsurged federal action to addressthe
country'sracialproblems.Legislationwas introducedintoCongressto make
lynchingsa federaloffenseand to eliminatethe poll tax. The SupremeCourt
by 1950 was hearingcases challengingPlessyv. Ferguson,and in 1952, the
JusticeDepartmentsubmittedamicus curiae briefscriticizingsegregationin
education.While proponentsof these civil rightsmeasureswere skeptical
about their success, conservativestook very seriously any discussion of
federalaction to dismantlesegregationwithinthe states.States'rightswere
ardentlydefended as the only bulwarkagainstan expansive federal governmentwhich would impose a host of liberal programs,including the
eliminationof racialrestrictionson marriage,propertyownership,and education.
Ifcivil rightswere the domesticaspectof the politicalenvironmentmost
relevantto treatyconsideration,the Cold Warwas the majorinternational
aspect. To conservativesof the time, the essence of the United Stateswas
was one extrememanifesclearlythreatenedby communists.McCarthyism
tation of concern that a worldwide communistmovement, directedfrom
Moscow, was taking power on a global scale, and that the United States
was the only country with the capability and potential will to halt the menace.
Certain major events contributed to these fears. With the explosion of a
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Sovietnucleardevice in 1950, the atomicmonopolyof the UnitedStates
The entireKoreanoperation,includingthe effectiveNorth
disappeared.
Koreanresistance,heightenedfearsof communistpowerandthe inability
of the UnitedStatesto confrontand resistit. Theascendenceof the CommunistPartyin China,when joinedwith the assumptionof Sino-Soviet
as seriously
by conservatives
friendshipand cooperation,was interpreted
States
influence
and
United
security.
damaging
concernscan be seen clearlyin delibTheeffectof theseconservative
erationover humanrightstreatiesin the 1950s. HumanrightstreatiesreceivedtheirmostextensivereviewbytheSenateduringthisperiodindebate
overthe so-calledBrickerAmendment.
Opponentsof the treaties,led by
SenatorBricker,focusedtheireffortson the adoptionof a constitutional
motivatedby the allegeddangerarising
amendment
whichwas primarily
fromthese treaties.Althoughinternational
legal scholarshave often acthisconnectionbetweenthehumanrightstreatiesandtheeffort
knowledged
intheearly1950sto amendthetreaty-making
of theConstitution,
provisions
mostinternational
relationsscholarshavenot.Mostmajorworkson American foreignpolicywhich mentionthe BrickerAmendmentimplythatits
of the president'spowerto conclude
majorpurposewas the curtailment
executiveagreements.4
One objectiveof thisresearch,then,is to clarifythe
betweenthe Bricker
andhumanrightstreaties.We
Amendment
relationship
contendthat,whilecriticismof the increaseduse of executiveagreements
wasreflectedinonesectionoftheamendment
anddidbecomean important
issue duringthe debates, the originalimpetus for the BrickerAmendment
was a concern about the United Nations human rightstreaties.And it was

inthecontextoftheBricker
Amendment
thatthesetreatieswere
controversy
brandedas dangerous
to theAmerican
wayof lifeandcastintoa Senatorial
limbofromwhichtheyhaveneverreallybeen released.
4. Of the majorforeignpolicy writerswho treatthe BrickerAmendment,the followingview
it primarilyas an attemptto curbthe use of executiveagreements:MerloPusey,Eisenhower
the President(New York:MacMillanCo., 1956), 231; RonaldStupak,AmericanForeign
Policy(NewYork:HarperandRow,1976), 112; AlexanderDeconde,A Historyof American
Sons,1971),778; CharlesKegleyandEugene
ForeignPolicy(NewYork:CharlesSchribner's
Wittkopf,AmericanForeignPolicy-Patterriand Process(New York:St. Martin'sPress,
1982), 416; JohnRehm,"MakingForeignPolicythroughInternational
Agreement,"in The
Constitutionand the Conductof ForeignPolicy, FrancisWilcox and RichardFrank,eds.
(New York:PraegerPublishers,1976), 128; JohnSpanier,"Congressand the Presidency:
TheWeakestLinkin the PolicyProcess,"in Congress,the Presidency,andAmericanForeign
Policy,JohnSpanierand JosephNogee, eds. (New York:PergamonPress,1981), xix.
Otherwriterslink the BrickerAmendmentto: congressionalnostalgiafor lost power
(WalterMurphy,Congressand the Court(Chicago:Universityof Chicago Press,1962),
258); an attemptto restrictpresidentialfreedomto commit U.S. troops overseas (John
Spanierand Eric Uslander,How AmericaForeignPolicy is Made (New York:Praeger
Publishers,1975), 81); and a neo-isolationistmovementto curtailU.S. internationalism
(LouisGersan,"J. F. Dulles," The AmericanSecretariesof State and TheirDiplomacy,
XVIII,RobertFerrell,ed. (New York:CooperSquarePublishers,1967), 118-22).
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Priorto considerationof the BrickerAmendment,the only extensive
postwarSenatedeliberationson humanrightstreatiesconcernedthe Genocide Convention.Manyof the argumentsbothforand againstthe Genocide
Conventionare specific to it, and thereforethese deliberationsare not a
good sourcefor generalargumentsagainsthumanrightstreaties.Nevertheless, the deliberationsare importantbecause they markedthe emergenceof
a smallbutstronggroupof opponentswho, despitethe overwhelmingsupport
for the Conventionfrom many and varied individualsand organizations,
managedto block the treaty.sEvenat this early point, opponentsdid not
considerthe Genocide Conventionto be an isolatedproblem,but partof a
much largermovement-the internationalrecognitionand legalcodification
of individualhuman rights-which they fearedwould alterthe natureand
processof the Americanpoliticalsystemand the Americanway of life. The
argumentsthat germinatedduringthe Genocide Conventionhearingslater
blossomed into full-fledgedoppositionto all humanrightstreaties.
The remainderof the articleis dividedintofoursections.Thefirstsection
is an analysisof the BrickerAmendmentitself,highlightingthe explicit and
implicit argumentsagainst human rightstreaties.Second, we summarize
Senate considerationof the BrickerAmendment.In the thirdsection, we
offera typologyof argumentsmadein the 1950s againstratificationof human
rightstreaties.Fourth,we considercontemporaryoppositionto the treaties,
assessingthe stabilityof argumentsover time and the factorsnow inhibiting
passage.
THE BRICKERAMENDMENT

The movementsurroundingthe proposal,modification,and supportof the
BrickerAmendmentreflecteda widespreadconcern within the American
electorate. Garrettidentifiestwo importantdimensionsof the movement:
(1) a "substantive"concern about increasingUnited States involvement
and (2) an "institutional"
internationally
dismayat the increasedpowerand
in
of
executive
the
foreignaffairs.6If we look closely at the
independence
5. Communications
supportingthe GenocideConventionwere receivedby the Senatefrom
organizationssuch as the AmericanFederationof Labor,AmericanLegion,American
Veterans'Committee,Amvets,BarAssociationof theCityof New York,CatholicAssociation
for International
Peace,Congressof Industrial
Organizations,FederalCouncilof Churches
of Christ,GeneralFederationof Women'sClubs,LoyalOrderof Moose, NAACP,National
andJews,NationalFederationof Businessand Professional
WomConferenceof Christians
en's Clubs,SalvationArmy,and UnitedCouncilof ChurchWomen.Fora moreextensive
list, see U.S. Congress.Senate. Committeeon ForeignRelations.Subcommitteeon the
Conventionon the Preventionand
Genocide Convention.Hearingson the International
Punishmentof the Crimeof Genocide.81st Cong.,2d sess., 1950. S. Rept.472.
The BrickerAmendmentin
6. SteveGarrett,"ForeignPolicyand the AmericanConstitution:
Contemporary
Perspective,"Int'IStudiesQ. 16:2 (1972): 187-220.
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immediatecause of concern, however,we can see thathumanrightstreaties
played the most importantrole in initiatingand maintainingthe spirited
attackon the treaty-makingpowers. Oppositionto the treaties,of course,
reflectedboth substantiveand institutionalconcerns. The substantiveconcern focused on the notionthathumanrightsfall withina nation'sdomestic
The instijurisdictionand are not an appropriatesubjectfor treaty-making.
tutional concern revolved around the issue of the distributionof power
between the federal governmentand the states; human rightsfall in the
domain of "states'rights"and are, therefore,reservedto the states by the
tenth amendmentto the Constitution.
One importantpointto be made is that,althoughtherearemanydifferent
reasons why various membersof the Senate in the 1950s supportedthe
collection of proposals now subsumed under the general term "Bricker
Amendment,"concern over the effects of human rightstreatieswas in the
forefront.SenatorBrickerhimself linked his proposalto his opposition to
the human rightstreatiesand their internationalimplementation:
Thereis a singlenessof purposeof courseon the partof all of us ... who have
of thisResolution.
... TheAmerican
joinedin thepresentation
peoplewantto
makecertainthatno treatyor executiveagreement
will be effectiveto denyor
abridgetheirfundamental
rights.Also,theydo notwanttheirbasichumanrights
to be supervised
or controlledby international
agenciesoverwhichtheyhave
no control.7
Anti-communistand anti-Sovietfeelings also provided motivationfor the
amendment,and often these two fearswere linked.
IronCurtain
wouldnodoubtwelcomea newRoosevelt-Litvinov
countries
agreementto maketheirconfiscatory
decreeseffectivein the UnitedStates....
one-worlders
fare]tryingto vestlegislative
[Rleactionary
powersin non-elected
officialsof the UN anditssatellitebodieswitha socialist-communist
majority.8
If we examine each section of the 1953 form of the amendment,we can
see reflectedthere a varietyof political and legal concerns raised by the
human rightstreaties.
Section 1
The firstsection of the BrickerAmendmentsimplystates:"A provisionof a
treatywhich denies or abridgesany rightenumeratedin this Constitution
7. U.S.Congress.Senate.Committeeon theJudiciarySubcommitteeon Constitutional
Amendments.Hearingson S. R. Res. I and S.1. Res.43, Treatiesand ExecutiveAgreements.83rd
Cong., 1st sess., 1953. S. Rept. 2-3. (Cited hereafteras: Senate judiciaryCommittee
Hearings,1953.)
8. SenatorJohn Bricker,quoted in "ForeignPolicy,"CongressionalQuarterlyAlmanac10
(1954): 245.
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shall not be of any force or effect" (emphasisadded). In defending Section 1, SenatorBrickersaid it would ensurethat "no [humanitarian]
treaty
can be effective to underminethe constitutionalrightsof Americancitizens....."9 The issuehere is the natureand extentof the limitson the content
of treaties.Some constitutionallaw scholarshad arguedthattreaties,being
the supreme law of the land, were not subject to normal constitutional
restrictions.Such would be a broad readingof ArticleVI, paragraph2, of
the Constitution:
all Treatiesmade,or whichshallbe made,underthe Authority
of the United
States,shallbe supremeLawof the land;andtheJudgesin everyStateshallbe
boundthereby,
orLawsof anyStateto theContrary
anythingintheConstitution
notwithstanding.

SenatorBrickerdescribedSection 1 in the following manner:
Section1 subjectsthePresident
restraints
inthe
andtheSenateto constitutional
exerciseofthetreaty-making
to
those
which
limit
their
action
powercomparable
as participants
intheenactment
of ordinary
Thiswas,of course,the
legislation.
inearlyjudicial
oftheConstitution
andwasreflected
originalintentoftheframers
dicta.'0

He was referringto the decision in Geofroyv. Riggs,which held that the
treatypower does not extend "so far as to authorizewhat the Constitution
forbids.""The difficulty,as SenatorBrickerviewed it, was the subsequent
decision of the SupremeCourtin Missouriv. Holland,which leftambiguous
the meaningof ArticleVI, paragraph2.
Actsof Congress
arethesupremelawof thelandonlywhenmadeinpursuance
of the Constitution,
whiletreatiesaredeclaredto be so whenmadeunderthe
of the UnitedStates.It is opento questionwhetherthe authority
of
authority
the UnitedStatesmeansmorethanthe formalacts prescribed
to makethe
convention.12
Brickersaw this decision in 1919 as effectivelyreversingthatof Geofroyv.
Riggs, and he argued that the lack of clarity on this crucial issue made
amendmentof the Constitutiona necessity.He arguedthatmostof the rights
contained in the Bill of Rightswould be "repealed"by ratificationof the
humanrightscovenant. His amendmentwould preventthis travesty.

9.-Senate JudiciaryCommitteeHearings,1953, note 7 above, 11.
Annalsof the Amer10. JohnBricker,"MakingTreatiesand OtherInternational
Agreements,"
ican Academy289 (1953): 137.
11. 133 U.S. 266 (1889).
12. Missouriv. Holland,252 U.S. 433 (1919).
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thatrightswhichtheyregardas GodTheAmerican
peopleresenttheargument
andtwo-thirds
of the
be
alienated
and
inalienable
can
by the President
given
Senatepresentandvoting.13
Section 2
It is in Section2 thatwe see most clearlythe institutionalline of attacklaid
by the Brickerproponents.They wished to secure greaterprotectionfor
states' rights,arguingthe constitutionalgroundsof the tenth amendment.
Section 2 of the BrickerAmendmentproposedthat:
No treatyshallauthorizeor permitany foreignpoweror any international
to supervise,
control,or adjudicate
organization
rightsof citizensof the United
in this constitution
Stateswithinthe UnitedStatesenumerated
or any other
matteressentially
withinthedomesticjurisdiction
of the UnitedStates.
The purpose of this section was to restrainthe federal governmentfrom
furtherencroachingupon states' rightsvia the treating-makingpower. As
has alreadybeen mentioned,a greatconcern was the use of these treaties
to establisha federalbasisfordesegregation.Thissectionwould haveenabled
Congressto review all treatiesbeforethey would have any domestic application, therebypreventingthe federalgovernmentfrom using treatiesas a
basisforexpandingitsauthorityintoareaswherepoweris otherwisereserved
to the states,underthe tenthamendmentto the Constitution.Thisissue arose
from one possible interpretationof the Missouriv. Holland decision. The
case concerned a treatybetween the United States and Great Britainregulating,for conservationpurposes,the takingof migratorybirds.The state
of Missourichallenged the treatyand the implementinglegislationon the
groundsthatit interferedwith states'rightsandviolatedthe tenthamendment
of the Constitution.In upholdingthe treatyand federal statute,Mr.Justice
Holmes stated:
Wedo notmeanto implythatthereareno qualifications
to thetreaty-making
in a different
power;buttheymustbe ascertained
way.Itis obviousthatthere
maybe mattersof the sharpestexigencyfor the nationalwell beingthatthe
act of Congresscouldnotdealwithbutthata treatyfollowedby suchan act
could.....
Thetreatyin questiondoes notcontravene
wordsto be found
anyprohibitory
intheConstitution.
Theonlyquestioniswhetheritisforbidden
bysomeinvisible
radiation
fromthe generaltermsof theTenthAmendment.14
13. SenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearings,1953, note 7 above, 6. Atthe timeof these Hearings,
therewas a single covenant.
14. Missouriv. Holland,252 U.S. 432 (1919).
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To this question he answered "no." And it is this issue which led to the
draftingof Section 2 of the BrickerAmendment.SenatorBrickerstated:
Section2 preventsthe President
andthe Senatefromusingtreatiesas an inof domesticlegislation
strument
withouttheparticipation
of the Houseof Representatives.
Inaddition,section2 protectsthe reserved
powersof thestatesby
preventing
Congressfromacquiringby treatylegislativepowerwhichit does
not possess in the absence of treaty....

[It]reversesthe doctrineof Missouri

v.Hollandwhichholdsthata treatymayempowerCongress
to legislateinareas
in theabsenceof treaty.1"
prohibited
by theTenthAmendment
In additionto states'rightsconcerns,Section 2 was designedto protect
UnitedStatesdomesticjurisdiction.SenatorBrickercitedArticle2, paragraph
7, of the United NationsCharterand arguedthat the humanrightstreaties
were violatingthis provision.
Arehumanrightsessentially
withinthedomesticjurisdiction?
Dr.PhilipJessup
andmanyotherswhohaverepresented
us atthe U.N.say,"No."Ifthatis true,
thennothingis essentially
withinthedomesticjurisdiction.
Thosewhooppose
section2 mustbelievethatthe relationship
betweentheAmerican
peopleand
theirowngovernment
is notpurelya domesticmatter."
He then explainedthat this reasonwas the motivatingforce behind all his
effortsto amend the Constitution.
Whatthisamendment
wouldinessencedo is to keeptherightsof theAmerican
realmandnotplacethemin the temporalpowerof an
peoplein the spiritual
international
whichis controlled
whicharetotalitarian
government
bycountries
in theirphilosophy
andseemto haveno conceptof the God-giveninalienable
rightsthatthe peopleof Americaenjoy.17
Section 3

A furtherconcernof thosesupportingthe BrickerAmendmentwas thatcourts
mightapply provisionsof the humanrightstreatiesdirectly,withoutimplementinglegislationfrom Congress.Since the treaties,in general, have no
explicit provisionthat they are not self-executing,this interpretation
might
be possible. BrickerdescribedSection 3 as an effortto preventthe invasion
of our domestic jurisdictionthroughthe instrumentalityof human rights
treaties.Section 3 read:"A treatyshall become effectiveas internallaw in
the UnitedStatesonly throughthe enactmentof appropriatelegislationby
the Congress."SenatorBrickercitedthe Fujiicase as a "reminderthattreaties
15. Bricker,note 10 above, 136.
16. SenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearings,1953, note 7 above, 9.
17. Ibid.,12.
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may have far-reachingand unintendedconsequences.... "1 Inthis case the
intermediateCaliforniacourtcited Articles55 and 56 of the United Nations
Charter,as invalidatingthe state'salien landact. SenatorBrickerconcluded:
If the SupremeCourtof the UnitedStatesshouldadoptthe reasoningof the
lowerCalifornia
Court,thousandsof FederalandStatelawswill be nullified.
to avoid
domesticlawmustbe madenon-self-executing
... Alltreatiesaffecting
and
of the rightsof theAmerican
unintentional
alteration
peopleunderFederal
Statelaws.19
Thissectionwas, in effect,a second line of defense in the eventthata human
rightstreatywas actuallyratifiedby the Senatewithouta non-self-executing
provisionor reservation.20Courts,then, would have been preventedfrom
citing treatyprovisionsthat had not been implementedby domestic legislation.
Section 4
The increasein the use of executive agreementsand theireffecton the rights
of Americansalso troubledSenatorBrickerand his supporters.Section 4
respondedto the fear of abrogationof rightsby agreementsnot submitted
to Congress:
andanyinternational
betweenthePresident
Allexecutiveandotheragreements
or
shall
official
thereof
be
made
organization,
onlyinthemanner
foreignpower,
andto theextentto be prescribed
shallbe subjectto
by law.Suchagreements
the limitations
imposedon treaties,or the makingof treaties,by thisarticle.
Thissection was a reactionto the SupremeCourt'sdecisions in the Belmont
and Pinkcases. At issue was the Litvinovagreement,signed as partof the
settlementsurroundingthe recognitionof the Sovietgovernment.Itwas not
submittedto Congress,and it did result in propertytransferswhich were
contraryto the state law of New York.Brickerbitterlypresentedthe case in
the following manner:
wereentitledto the protection
of the fifthamendment.
Both
Foreigncreditors
Russiaandthe UnitedStateswerepowerlessto deprivethemof thatproperty.
Courtheldthatanagreement
theSupreme
betweenFranklin
Roosevelt
However,
andMaximLitvinov
cancelledout propertyrightsotherwiseprotectedby the
fifthamendment
andthe publicpolicyof the Stateof NewYork.21
18. Ibid.,7.
19. Ibid.,7--8.
20. An attachmentto the ratificationresolutionforthe GenocideConventionrequiresexactly
thisstep:thatimplementinglegislationbe enactedby Congressbeforethe treatyis officially
ratifiedby the UnitedStates.
21. SenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearings,1953, note 7 above, 7-8.
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The more general issue was the determinationby the Courtthat: "A treaty
is a "law of the land"underthe supremacyclause ... of the Constitution.
Suchinternational
compactsand agreementsas the Litvinovassignmenthave
a similardignity."22In other words, executive agreementshave the same
constitutionalstatusas treaties.Thus,the Brickerforcesarguedthatif human
rightstreaties and agreementswere acceded to by the United States as
executiveagreementswithoutthe consentof the Senate,they could be used
to deprive Americansof their basic rights, includingthe rightto private
property.
Summary
Inthe finalanalysis,it would appearthatthe crucialtopic of debate became
whether or not human rights is an appropriatesubject matterfor treatymaking.Oppositionto the conclusionof humanrightstreatiescame to signify
the protectionof domesticjurisdiction,the maintenanceof states'rights,and
the defense against the encroachmentof internationalorganizations.As
SenatorBrickerput it: "the peace of the world is endangeredby the U.N.'s
ambitionto superviseand control the purelydomestic affairsof its members.. ."23 He specificallyattackedthe covenant:
of the previousadministration
the StateDepartment
contendedthatthe U.N.
draftCovenants
on HumanRightsweregreathumanitarian
treaties,andthatthe
American
submittheirpolitical,civil,andeconomic
peopleshouldcheerfully
andcontrol.24
supervision,
rightsto UnitedNationsdefinition,

FORMAL
DELIBERATIONS
CONGRESSIONAL
On 17 July1951, SenatorBrickermade a directattackon the humanrights
treatiesby proposingthat the Senate adopt a resolutionthat would have
requiredthat the presidentannounce that the covenantwas unacceptable
and withdrawthe United Statesfrom participationin draftingit and other
humanrightstreaties.Inthe courseof debate,SenatorBrickercharacterized
the covenantas "a Covenanton HumanSlavery,"a legalizationof "themost
vicious restrictionsof dictators,"a "legalbasisfor the most repressivemeasuresof atheistictyranny,""an attemptto repealthe Billof Rights,"a threat
to freedomof religion,and "a blueprintfor tyranny."25
22.
23.
24.
25.

U.S. v. Pink,315 U.S. 230 (1942).
SenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearings,1953, note 7 above, 9.
Ibid.,10.
CongressionalRecord.82nd Cong., 1st sess. 1951. Vol. 97, pt. 8, 8255.
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By 14 September1951, SenatorBrickermoved to introducea constitutional amendment aimed at protectingthe "sacred rightswhich [U.S.
On 7 February
citizens]enjoy underthe Billof Rightsandthe Constitution."26
1952, SenatorBrickerintroduced,with fifty-nineco-sponsors,a second constitutionalamendment.27In introducingthe amendment,Senator Bricker
made specific mentionof the human rightscovenants.
Thereis nottheremotest
ofthepresentSenatewould
chancethatevenone-third
the rightsof theAmerican
undermine
peopleby votingforthe U.N. Covenant
on HumanRightsor anyothertreatyof similarimport.However,the rightsand
freedomsenumerated
in the Constitution
mustbe protectedin perpetuity,
and
of the Senators
not merelyby the suffranceof the Presidentand two-thirds
presentandvoting.28
The SenateJudiciaryCommitteeheld hearingson the BrickerAmendment
in Mayand Juneof 1952. By a vote of nine to five, the Committeeapproved
an amendedversion, but the Senate adjournedwithoutdebatingthe issue.
On 7 January1953, SenatorBrickeronce again introduceda constitutionalamendment,thistime co-sponsoredby sixty-twoSenators.29
Support
had grown for some form of the amendmentand passage appearedlikely.
At the hearingsheld in 1953 by the SenateJudiciaryCommittee,the Eisenhower administrationexpressed its opposition to the amendmentthrough
testimonyby Secretaryof State Dulles. Dulles had the difficulttask of reversinghimselfpubliclyon humanrightstreaties.Supportersof the Bricker
Amendmenthad frequentlycited a speech by Dulles in which he statedthat
treaties "can take powers from the States and give them to the Federal
Governmentor to some internationalbody, and they can cut across the
In an effort
rightsgiven the people by their constitutionalBill of Rights."30
to assuage the fears of the Brickerfollowers and undercutsupportfor the
amendment,Dulles made the following conciliatorystatement:
Thisadministration
is committedto the exerciseof the treatymakingpower
only within traditionallimits. . ... [W]hile we [the administration]shall not

withholdour counselfromthosewho seek to drafta treatyor covenanton
humanrights,we do notourselveslookupona treatyas the meanswhichwe
wouldselectas the properand mosteffectiveway to spreadthroughout
the
worldthe goalsof humanliberty.... We,therefore,
do not intendto become
a partyto anysuchcovenantor presentit as a treatyforconsideration
by the
Senate.... 31

26. Ibid.,11361.
27. CongressionalRecord.82nd Cong.,2d sess., 1952. Vol. 98, pt. 1, 907-14. Also, Laurence
Smith(R-Wisc.)introducedthe same amendmentinto the Houseon 11 February1952.
28. Ibid.,908.
29. S.J.130 was introducedand expiredduringthe 82nd Congress.
30. John Brickerand CharlesWebb, "TreatyLaw vs. Domestic ConstitutionalLaw,"Notre
Dame LawReview29:4 (1954): 531.
31. SenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearings,1953, note 7 above, 825.
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He also said that the administrationhad no intentionof recommending
ratificationof the Genocide Convention.Despite this appeal, the Senate
Committeeon ForeignRelationsvoted to approvethe amendment.
Floordebatebeganon 20 January1954. The Eisenhoweradministration
continued to oppose the BrickerAmendmentbut had approveda much
weakerproposal,the Knowlandversion,which had been offeredas a substitute.32When the votes were finally taken, the Brickerversion failed to
receive the requisitetwo-thirdsvote for a constitutionalamendment--fiftytwo Senatorsvoted in favor,while fortywere opposed.33A weakerversion
proposed by SenatorGeorge came closer, falling one vote short of the
requirement.
What is importantto rememberin assessingthese deliberationsis that,
while supportersof the amendmentwere reacting against human rights
treaties,opponentsof theamendmentwerenotarguingin favorof the treaties.
Argumentsagainstthe BrickerAmendmenthad littlerelevanceto the debate
overhumanrightstreaties,andthe defeatof the BrickerAmendmentrevealed
nothingaboutsupportforthe treaties.Opponentsargued,for example,that
the amendmentwould interferewiththe day-to-dayconductof foreignaffairs,
significantlyalter a constitutionalbalance of power that had worked well
for 160 years, endanger national survival,limit the president'sability to
conduct and end a war, impede arrangementsfor the control of atomic
energyand nuclearweapons, and embarrassthe presidentin frontof both
allies and enemies.34
Throughoutthe recordsof the public debates relatedto human rights
treaties,a single privateinterestgroup consistentlyheld a dominantplace
and deservesspecial consideration:the AmericanBarAssociation(ABA).35
The determinationwithinthe ABAthat humanrightstreatiesposed a threat
to Americans'basic rightsand to theirsystemof governmentwas crucialto
the popularityof the Brickerproposal. In introducingthe amendmentin
1953 SenatorBrickersaid:
I shouldliketo paytributeto the magnificent
workof the AmericanBarAson PeaceandLawthrough
UnitedNationsinalerting
sociationanditsCommittee
theAmerican
power.36
peopleto the dangersinherentin thetreaty-making

"ForeignPolicy,"CongressionalQuarterlyAlmanac10 (1954):255.
Ibid.,255.
SenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearings,1953, note 7 above.
The role of the ABAhas been discussed in an articleby JohnSchmidhauserand Larry
Berg,"TheABAand the HumanRightsConventions:The PoliticalSignificanceof Private
Professional
SocialResearch38 (1971):362-410. See also "ForeignPolicy,"
Associations,"
CongressionalQuarterlyAlmanac9 (1953):233.
36. CongressionalRecord.82nd Cong.,2d sess., 1952. Vol. 98, pt. 1, 910.
32.
33.
34.
35.
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A study of ABArecordsrevealsthatthe human rightstreatiesprovidedthe
initialimpetusforthe formulationof the amendmentand a substantialreason
for the ABA'sstrongsupportof it.37
The ABAhas consistentlyheld a special status in the Senate'sconsideration of the human rightstreaties. Its unique position was reflected in
numerousstatementsby SenatorBrickerin which he expressedhis gratitude
to the ABAfor their help, includingtheir suggestionson the rewordingof
ABAmemberstestifyingin favorof the amendmentwere
the amendment.38
given special consideration;forexample,they were invitedby the Chairman
of the Subcommitteeto sit at his table." Special care was takento consider
their convenience for attending,and they were informedwhen important
witnesseswere testifyingagainstthe amendment.Duringthe hearings,they
frequentlyquestionedotherwitnesses,a privilegenormallyreservedto members of the subcommittee.Arrangementswere made so that one member
could testifyafterall the opponentshad finishedtheirtestimonyin orderto
respondto any argumentsthat had been made.40 And, throughoutthe deliberations,ABApositionson the amendmentand on varioustreatieswere
cited by othersas authoritative.
AGAINSTRATIFICATION
A TYPOLOGY
OF ARGUMENTS
Previoussectionshave examinedthe argumentsagainsthumanrightstreaties
foundwithinthe BrickerAmendmentitselfand withinformalcongressional
deliberations.This section presentsa typology of argumentsoffered in oppositionto ratificationof humanrightstreatiesin the 1950s. While numerous
hearingswere held on the BrickerAmendmentduringthis period,the single
best source of anti-ratificationargumentsis the set of hearingsheld by the
SenateJudiciaryCommitteein Februaryand Aprilof 1953. These were the
most extensive hearingsand they occurred when Senate supportfor the
amendmentwas at its strongest. During these hearings, the Eisenhower
administrationmade its commitmentnot to ratifythe humanrightstreaties.
Thisaction made subsequenthearingsless fruitfulforour purposes,because
it reducedthe numberof referencesby witnesses to the treaties.
Contentanalysis of the 1953 hearings(the proceduresfor which are
describedin greaterdetail in the next section) reaffirmsthe appropriateness
of using these hearingsto explore argumentsagainsthumanrightstreaties.
37. See NatalieHevenerKaufman,Whythe UnitedStatesDoesn'tRatifyHumanRightsTreaties,
forthcoming.
38. SenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearings,1953, note 7 above, 158.
39. Ibid.,3.
40. Ibid.,158.
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TABLE
Analysisof Testimonyin Supportof The BrickerAmendment,
SenateJudiciaryCommitteeHearings,1953

Topic
HumanRightsTreaties
GeneralAbuseof TreatyPower
ExecutiveAgreements
Other***

ABA
Testimony
(n- 208)

Percentageof
Non-ABA
Testimony*
(n= 92)

49.5**
31.2
11.1
8.2

51.1
46.7
0.0
2.2

All
Testimony
(n= 300)
50.0
36.0
7. 7
6.3

fromthe followingorganizations:Veterans
*Includedin this categorywere representatives
of ForeignWarsof the UnitedStates,New OrleansState,AmericanFlagCommittee,andNational
Societyof the Daughtersof the AmericanRevolution.
**Figureswere computedby dividingthe numberof pages of testimonydevoted to each
topic by the total numberof pagesof testimony.The hearingincluded300 pagesof testimony
in supportof the Brickeramendment.
***The"Other"categoryincludesothertopics discussedby witnesses,discussionsrelated
to the procedureof the hearingsthemselves,and supplementarymaterialsprovidedby the
witnesses-such as textsof treatiesand listsof organizationsand countries.

Each page of testimonyin supportof the BrickerAmendmentwas coded
accordingto the dominanttopic of discussion.The resultsindicateda clear
focus on human rightstreaties.Accordingto Table 1, the topic of human
rightstreatiesaccounted for 50 percentof the testimony.The other major
issues of the hearings,executive agreementsand the general abuse of the
treaty-makingpower,togetheraccountedfor 43.7 percent.Also clear from
the table is the significanceof the roleof the ABA.Thetestimonyof members
of the ABA'sSpecial Committeeon Peace and Law throughthe United
Nationsaccountedfor 69 percentof all testimonyin supportof the Bricker
Amendment.The statementsused in the remainderof this section to exemplifythe argumentsproposedare drawn almost entirelyfrom this ABA
testimony.
DiminishBasic Rights
The mostfrequentlymentionedargumentsagainsthumanrightstreatieswas
that the treatieswould diminishbasic rights.They reflecta lower standard
of rights,either intentionallyor as a resultof inevitablecompromises,and
citizens of the United Statesstandto lose ratherthan gain fromratification
of the treaties.The argumentrests on the contention that once a human
rightstreatyis ratified,constitutionalprotectionswould be superceded.Ar-
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thurJ. Schweppe, chair of the ABACommitteeon Peace and Lawthrough
the United Nations,stressedthis idea in his testimony:"The limitationsin
the firstamendmentwith respectto freedomof speech, press, and religion
are only limitationson Congress.They are not a limitationon the treatymakingpower."41And FrankHolman, one-time ABApresident,presented
this argumentdramatically:
the"internationalists"
andtheStateDepartment
movestepbystep-firstaspirain treatyform,then international
of these aspirations
tions,then ratification
courtsto enforcethe aspirations.
Thusourinternalrightsunderourown ConandBillof Rights,areto be undermined
stitution,
stepbystepandwillcontinue
to be undermined
unlesstheAmerican
peopleshutoffthisinsidiousprocessby
an appropriate
constitutional
amendment.42
Variousspecific rightswhich were thoughtto be endangered,including
mostof the rightsin the Billof Rights,were discussedthroughoutthe hearings.
The testimony of ABA member EberhardDeutsch on the freedom of the
pressconveys the flavorof these attacks:"[thetreaties]containthe festering
germsof destructionof a free press beyond the antisepticpropertiesof the
firstamendment."43
Violate States' Rights
Another frequentlycited objection to the human rightstreatieswas the
alleged threatthey posed to states'rights.The treaties,it was argued,would
legitimizefederal action in areasformerlyreservedto the states. Some opponents identified supremacyof the federal governmentas the ultimate
objective of the treaties.Deutsch statedclearly:
it is impossibleto overemphasize
the significanceof presentconstitutionally
possibleabusesof the treatymaking
powerin the UnitedStates.Theunquestionableobjectiveof at leastsomeof theopponentsof constitutional
limitation
of thatpoweris earlyelimination
of Stateandlocalpoliticalentitiesexceptas
administrativeagencies of the Nation. . ... The gilding of multipartitetreaties

with such idealisticimmediategoals as the preventionof genocideand the
of humanrightscannotconcealtheirunderlying
promotion
objective
long-range
to destroylocalgovernment
whileexpanding
the sphereof nationalpower."
41. Ibid.,59.
42. Ibid., 143. Holmanwas presidentof the ABAfrom 1948 to 1949. He led a campaign,
beginningin 1947, to alert the countryto the dangersof "treatylaw."This campaign
targetedthe United Nationshumanrightstreatiesas a threatto the Americansystemand
identifiedlawyersas the primaryactorsin haltingthe developmentandratificationof these
treaties.
43. Ibid.,116.
44. Ibid.,115, 116.
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Federalaction with respectto civil rightswas very much on the minds
of those supportingthe BrickerAmendment.FrankHolman describedhis
concern:
at the expense
[Atreaty]can increasethe powersof the FederalGovernment
of the States.Forexample,in the so-calledfieldof civilrights,a treatycando
hastodaterefused
todo.TheCongress
refused
whattheCongress
hastheretofore
to enactthecivilrightsprogram.45
He went on to explain that the federalgovernmentcould accomplishthis
objectivethroughratificationof the humanrightstreaties.Deutscharticulated
the commonconcernthatthe treatieswould be usedspecificallyto legitimize
federallegislationon racialmatters:"andthe same instrumenthas recently
been cited with greatforce as a prohibitionof racesegregationin the District
of Columbia,in Kansas,and in other States."46
A common metaphorfor the treatiesoften heard duringthe hearings
was that of the TrojanHorse. Deutschexplainedthe metaphorwell:
the treatyclauseof the Constitution
(articleVI)[is]as a 'TrojanHorse,'ready
Statelawsandconstito unloadits hiddensoldieryintoourmidst,destroying
Fathers
tutionsandleavingbehindthewreckageof thedreamof the Founding
balancebeof the establishedconstitutional
whichenvisionedmaintenance
of the Billof Rightsintact.47
tweenStateandFederalpower,andpreservation
Some of the specificstates'rightswhich were mentionedduringthe hearings
as being in dangerof encroachmentwere the rightsto restrictland sales on
the basis of race and nationalorigin, set criminaland civil liabilities,determine the political rightsof women, establish qualificationsfor public
school teachers,and regulatemembershipin the medical and legal professions-which seemed especiallyunsettlingto the testifyingABAmembers.48

PromoteWorldGovernment
A thirdargumentwhich was made frequentlyduringthe hearingswas that
human rightstreatiesconstituteda move in the directionof establishinga
worldgovernment.An ABAmemorandumon the amendmentwas included
in the testimonyof VernonHatch and referredto the issue of world government.

45.
46.
47.
48.

Ibid.,145.
Ibid.,116.
Ibid.,119.
Ibid.,100, 120-23, 1107, 1131, 1132.
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Notonlyisthetreatypowera threatto theStates,it is a threatto theveryFederal
Government
itselfthroughthepressures
of inter-nationally
mindedgroupswho
wouldfavorerectinga worldgovernment
bythetreatyrouteinwhosefavorwe
wouldabdicatemuch,if notall, of oursovereignty....49
The dangerevoked by Holmanis of Americanswakingup to find thatthey
are living under world government."We [could] have had a full-fledged
world governmentovernight,and this is exactly what may happen under
so-called treatylaw unless a constitutionalamendmentis passed protecting
Americanrights... ."50so
Opponentsof the amendmentare portrayedas at
best misguided and at worst ill-intentioned.George Finch's testimony is
addressedto the former.
Theadoptionof the proposedconstitutional
amendment
nowbeforethiscommitteerelatingto the treatymaking
trendto
powerwouldstopthe prevailing
of
regardthe UnitedNationsas butthefirststepin the ultimateestablishment
a worldgovernment
in whichthe UnitedStateswouldoccupythe positionof
a province.... Now,theso-calledliberals,thepeoplewhoareopposingthings
thatwe aretryingto do herewouldtakeus backintothaterafromwhichwe
our sovereignty,
which meansour
emerged300 yearsago and subordinate
freedomand our independence,
to someforeignpowerin whichwe would
havebutone voteamongmany...*.s
The latterview of the opposition is presentedby Deutsch.
Itis difficultto believethatobjectionsto a constitutional
bulwark
againstdirect
legislativeparticipation
by Polandand the Argentinein the local affairsof
Louisiana
andNorthDakotaandOhioandUtahcanbe rootedin goodfaith."s

SubjectCitizensToTrialAbroad
A continuingargumentwhich arousedstrongemotional responsewas the
allegationthat humanrightstreatieswould lead to the trialof Americansin
foreign courts.The majorpoints of the allegationare described in Ober's
testimony.
Amongthe 200 treatiesthatare beingproposedis a treatycreatingan internationalcriminalcourt... a courtcomposedof all butone of foreignjudges,
includingjudgesfromothercountrieswho haveno conceptionof our independentjudiciarybutthinkonlyof the judgesas an armof the politicalgovernment.s3
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Ibid.,105.
Ibid.,143.
Ibid.,1108.
Ibid.,115.
Ibid.,168.
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As implied in the statementabove, aversionto the idea of trials abroad
carriedwith it a suspicionof foreignjudicialsystemsand fear of the loss of
proceduralsafeguards.
the GenocideConvention
is stillon the agendaof the Senatefor
Meanwhile,
ratification,
which,if ratified,would,amongotherthings,commitus to the
principleof the trial of Americancitizens in foreign courts . . . where our

constitutional
trialprocedures
andBillof Rightswouldnotoperate.s4
Threaten Our Form of Government

A fifthline of oppositionto the humanrightstreatieswas the allegationthat
they constitutea serious threatto our form of government.In additionto
the disintegrationof the line between federaland state powers, testimony
beforethe SenateJudiciaryCommitteefrequentlypredictedthe generaldestructionof the Americanpolitical system. The ABAStandingCommittee
reportexemplifiedthis line of reasoning,suggestingthat "the real significance" of the amendmentwas "thepreservationof our formof government
againstthe abuse of the treatypower."55Holmanmade a similarargument
speakingof the humanrightstreatiesand the need for the amendment.
Ourown Billof Rightsforbidsthe Congressto changeourbasicrightsbutas
the Constitution
now standsit does not preventour basicrightsfrombeing
a
madeby the treatymaking
by
treaty
agencywhichconsistsof the
changed
andtwo-thirds
President
of theSenators
presentandvoting.Thisis theloophole
in the Constitution
thatwe now face andthroughwhichthe internationalists
to
move
and
rights
by treatylawchangeandleveloutourAmerican
propose
andtherebychangeourformof government."
(bothStateandindividual)

EnhanceSoviet/CommunistInfluence
McCarthyismand the Cold War,which dominatedthe politics of the early
1950s, had a clear impact on the debates concerning the human rights
treaties.Argumentsrelatedto the communistscareappearedin two different
forms.One, closely relatedto the precedingargument,emphasizedthe direct
threatposed by the Soviet Union. The treatieswere presentedas manifestationsof Soviet effortsto underminethe Americansystem. Againthe testimonyof Finchis instructive:

54. Ibid.,143-44.
55. Ibid., 47.

56. Ibid.,144.
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in the negotiation
of treaties,the effect
the UnitedStatesshouldnotparticipate
of whichwouldbe to buildaroundus a wall of socialisticand communist
in anticipation
containment
of the witheringawayof ourprinciplesof human
to secure
we haveestablished
freedomandof thedecayof thefreeinstitutions
thatwe can resistindefinitely
them.Arewe so certainof ourinternalstrength
the communistic
softeningto whichwe arebeingsubjected?s7
Morefrequently,the spectreof communismappearedin allegationsthatthe
treatiescontain socialist rights.The dangersoutlinedwere multiple.
of world-wide
reform
Oneof thefirstdocumentsproducedunderthisprogram
... was the so-calledDeclarationof HumanRights.... Thisdeclaration,among

for socializingthe world,includingthe
otherthings,is a completeblueprint
UnitedStates.Article23 providesthateveryonehas the rightto "justand
favorable
of workandto protection
andthat
conditions
againstunemployment"
.. ."Thepurpose
everyonehasthe rightto "justandfavorableremuneration.
providedwas to liquidateourindividual
enterprise
system.58
SenatorBrickeralso presentedhis concern thatthe treatieswould alterour
"controlover our domestic, social, and economic rights,world medicine,
socialized medicine.... I am tryingto plug that loophole so thattherewill
be no possibilityof it."59He also addressedthe issue by stating:"Youknow
thatthe AmericanMedicalSociety is greatlydisturbedaboutthe possibility
of socialized medicine in this countrycoming in by the back door of treaties."60
Infringeon Domestic Jurisdiction
The human rightstreatieswere consistentlycriticized on the groundsthat
they infringedupon the UnitedStatesdomesticjurisdictionand violatedthe
domesticjurisdictionclause of the UnitedNationsCharter.Some opponents
believed that the treaties involved mattersthat were essentiallydomestic
and beyond the legitimatereach of an internationalorganization.Holman
made this claim in citing a memberof the United Nations Human Rights
Division:
who statedthatwhatthe Commission
con[on HumanRights]was proposing
stitutedan intervention
in matters"withinthe domesticjurisdiction"
of the
memberstates.Andheexposedthiswholeprogram
whichhassincebeenunder
of peaceat all, buta
way in the UnitedNations,in myopinionnota program
formeddlingin the affairsof the memberstates.6'
program
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Ibid.,1109-110.
Ibid.,136.
Ibid.,155.
Ibid.,112.
Ibid.,133.
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Deutsch expressed the contention that domestic jurisdiction was threatened
by human rights treaties:
With similarsuavity,albeit with greaterlogic, we were assuredthat section 7
of articleIIof the Charterof the UnitedNationsgave us addedprotectionagainst
interferenceby thatworldorganizationin our domesticaffairs.Buttodayeven
the opponentsof constitutionallimitationson treatymaking
powercan no longer
sustaintheirconfidence in understandingsand reservationsas adequatesafeguardsagainstthe destructivepotentialitiesof internationalconventions.62

Create Self-ExecutingObligations
A further,somewhattechnical argument,made primarilyby lawyers,was
thatthe treatieswere self-executing.Self-executingtreatiesneed no implementinglegislationto be effectiveand can be cited and appliedby domestic
courts.As we have seen, one provisionof the BrickerAmendmentwas that
no treatywould be implementedwithout congressionallegislation.Finch
explainedthis purposeof the amendment."The purposeof the American
BarAssociationamendment[is] to make all treatiesnon-self-executingas
internallaw andthus requirelegislationto makethem internallyeffective."63
He also elaboratedupon the special problemsof the humanrightstreaties
as self-executing.
Thatis why we had all this discussionaboutthe Treatyon HumanRights.
or resolution
or draft
... TheUnitedNationsitselfcannotby anydeclaration
treatymakelawwithintheUnitedStates.Whentheydo tryto do it,it is through
the treatymethodbecause of our peculiarprovisionof our Constitution.What
we are tryingto do now is to plug thatgap so they cannot do it thatway and

wouldbe obligedto resortto legislation
by thewholeCongress."
IncreaseInternationalEntanglements

Other argumentswere generatedby antipathytowardthe United Nations
and UnitedNationsagencies and a fearof foreignentanglements.Non-ABA
witnesses were particularlyoutspokenabout theirsuspicionsof the United
Nations activities,especially action relatedto human rights.Forexample,
ReverendDeLoss Scott appeared on behalf of the AmericanCouncil of
ChristianChurchesand spoke against the United Nations and especially
62. Ibid.,115.
63. Ibid.,1123.
64. Ibid.,1148.
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againstthe Covenanton HumanRightsand the Genocide Convention.He
cited the opening words of the Charterwhich "bringsthe United Nations
down into the realmof humanaffairs,affairswhich affectour daily lives as
individuals"and praised Senator PatrickMcCarranfor his regret"to my
dying day that ever voted for the U.N. Charter."6s
W. L. McGrath,speaking on behalf of the United States Chamberof
Commerce, presenteda very critical view of the United Nations and its
agencies. In speakingof the treatiesproduced by the United Nations, he
said:
Don'tyou see how deviousthesepeopleplanhow theymoveintothe back
doorif theycan'tdealwithyou at thefrontdoor?Theygo aroundto the back
door.Andthatisdangerous....Theissuecannotbedismissed
bysayingcasually
thatof courseeven a barequorumof the Senatecouldnotconceivablyratify
withtheConstitution."
anythingthatwouldnotbe in conformity
Associatedwith the neo-isolationismof the time was an ethnocentrism,a
suspicion of foreign states and a fear of entanglingalliances. Holmanexpressedthe firstof these concerns. "Why should we overlay our inherent
and preciousrightsand freedomswith a patternof internationalrightsdrawn
to suit the concepts of more than 60 nationswith varyingand antagonistic
concepts."" And Mrs.EnidGriswold,representingthe NationalEconomic
Council,referredto the second of these issues. "Theroleof worldleadership
which ... has been thrustupon us, can best be fulfilledby preservingour
AmericanRepublicand by limitingour internationalcommitmentsto what
we can do withoutweakeningourselves."68

CONTEMPORARY
OPPOSITIONIN PERSPECTIVE
To what extent, then, do the argumentsagainst human rightstreatiesdeveloped in the 1950s, which crystalizedduringthe debate over the Bricker
Amendment,continue to influence contemporarycongressionaldeliberations? We have explored two sources of data in addressingthis question.
First,we have comparedthe 1953 hearingson the BrickerAmendmentwith
roughlycomparablecontemporaryhearings.Second, we have interviewed
congressionalstaffmembersin an attemptto assess the importanceof the
Brickerlegacy fromtheir perspective.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Ibid.,273-74.
Ibid.,565.
Ibid.,142.
Ibid.,176.
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Stabilityof ArgumentsOver Time
Two sets of congressionalhearingswere selected for content analysis.As
already noted, the Brickerhearingsin 1953 representthe best source of
argumentsagainsthumanrightstreatiesfromthe 1950s. Formore contemporaryarguments,the single best source is the recordof hearingsheld in
1979 concerningfour human rightstreatieswhich were sent to the Senate
by PresidentCarterin 1978.69 Contentanalysisof the hearings,which included testimonyfrommembersof Congressas well as otherwitnesses,was
limitedto those witnesseswho eithersupportedthe BrickerAmendmentin
the 1953 hearingsor opposed any of the treatiesdiscussed at the 1979
hearings.
The content of the testimonyof each of the witnesses was analyzed
accordingto the list of majorlines of arguments,and minorvariationson
those arguments,presentedin the Appendix(which summarizesthe discussion fromthe precedingsection).All specific referencesto one or more
human rightstreatieswere examined,and each new appearanceof an argumentwas assignedto the propercategory.70Hearingswere coded independently by two investigators,and inconsistentcodings were analyzed
further.Resultsof the analysis are presented in Table 2, which provides
figureswhich indicate,of thetotalnumberof argumentsmadeinthe hearings,
the percentageof times each individualargumentappeared.
The resultsin Table 2 indicatethe consistencyof argumentsmade in
oppositionto human rightstreaties,along with some interestingvariation
over time. Perhapsthe clearestindicationof consistencyis that93.5 percent
of the argumentswhich appeared in the 1979 hearingswere essentially
unchangedfrom 1953. In addition,the relativefrequencyof argumentsdid
not change significantly.The two principleargumentsin both periods-that
the treatieswould diminishbasic rightsand violate states'rights-held the
same rankingsand accounted for a substantialproportionof the total arguments(38.2 percentin 1953 and 56.1 percent in 1979). The only arguments'which declined dramaticallyin frequencywere concerns that the
treatieswould subjectcitizens to trialabroadand would increaseinternational entanglements.The remainingargumentsfrom 1953 were all clearly
evidentin the 1979 hearings,with theirrelativefrequenciesnot significantly
altered.
69. The four treatieswere: the two covenants,the AmericanConvention,and the Racial
Discrimination
Convention.
70. Forsimilareffortssee Ole Holsti,ContentAnalysisforthe SocialSciencesand Humanities
(MenloPark,California:
Addison-Wesley
PublishingCompany,1969);andStevendel Sesto,
"NuclearReactorSafetyand the Role of the Congressman:A ContentAnalysisof CongressionalHearings,"journalof Politics42 (1980):227-41.
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TABLE
2
Analysisof ArgumentsMadeAgainstHumanRightsTreaties,
Basedon Senate Hearingsin 1953 and 1979
1979
1953
Percentage Rank Percentage Rank
DiminishBasicRights
ViolateStates'Rights
PromoteWorldGovernment
EnhanceSoviet/Communist
Influence
SubjectCitizensto TrialAbroad
ThreatenOur Formof Government
Infringeon DomesticJurisdiction
IncreaseInternational
Entanglements
CreateSelf-Executing
Obligations
Other
New 1979 Arguments
Total

21.4%
16.8
13.6
11.2
10.6
7.8
6.5
5.1
4.9
2.1
100.0
(n= 387)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

32.7%
23.4
6.5
4.7
0.9
11.2
5.6
0.9
2.8
4.8

1
2
4
8
10
3
6
10
9
7

6.5

4

100.0
(n= 107)

The two new argumentswhich appeared during the 1979 hearings
reflectedchanges in the politicaland economic environment.The firstnew
argumentwas a responseto the increasednumberof uncompensatedexpropriationsof United Statesassets abroadand the apparenteffortby developing countriesto legitimizethem. This argumentattacksthe covenant
provisionon permanentsovereigntyovernaturalresources.The UnitedStates
representativethroughoutthe draftingof the treatiesarguedthatthe wording
mightbe interpretedas allowingexpropriationof foreigninvestmentwithout
promptand adequate compensation.SenatorJesse Helms was especially
incensed about this provision,which he argued "would for the firsttime
legitimize the unlawful expropriationwithout compensation or arbitrary
seizure of Americans'propertyoverseas."71
The second new argumentarosefromdomesticoppositionto the women's movement,particularlythe ERA.PhyllisSchlaflywas vehement in her
contentionin thatthe treatieswould depriveAmericanwomen of important
protections.Forexample,she arguedthatthe Covenanton Civiland Political
Rightswould obligate the federal governmentto "registerand conscript

71. U.S. Congress.Senate.Committeeon ForeignRelations.Hearingson International
Human
RightsTreaties.96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979. S. Rept.8.
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women formilitaryservice"whenevermen were registeredand conscripted.
She also linkedthe destructionof women's rightsto the loss of states'rights:
lawsof mostof the 50 statesby
mhis covenantwouldchangethe marriage
imposing'equalityof rights'as betweenthe spousesduringmarriage.... The
Covenant
wouldalsotakeawaythe rightsof statelegislatures
in thefiftystates
to enactandretainthe marriage
lawsdesiredby the peopleof eachstateand
devisedin a processof democratic
decision-making.72
FactorsInhibitingAction
A secondavenueforexploringcontemporaryargumentsagainsthumanrights
treatiesis to assess the currentopinions of membersof the Senate Foreign
RelationsCommittee.We interviewedthe primaryforeignpolicy staffmembers of ten of the sixteen committee membersin the 98th Congress.Respondents were guaranteedanonymity.All unattributedquotationsin this
section are fromthese interviews.Interviewsrangedin durationfromforty
to ninetyminutesand were conducted in January1984.
At the time of the interviews,congressionalaction on human rights
treatiesappearedto be extremelyunlikely.Whilestillformallypendingbefore
the Senate ForeignRelationsCommittee,the treatieswere not on the congressionalagenda. Supportersof the treatiesdid not appearto be planning
any actionto stimulatecongressionalconsideration.Theysaw littlepolitical
benefit to be gained in advocatingthe treaties,and feared the potential
politicalcontroversyas the latentoppositionto the treatiesonce again became vocal. Supporterswere convinced that "if they brought[the treaties]
up, they would be filibustered,and therewould be effortsto amendthem."
One clear findingis that,whateverthe influenceof the BrickerAmendment, it is not often based on direct knowledgeabout the Brickerdebate.
Fewof the staffmembersinterviewedwere even familiarwith the specifics
of the debate in the 1950s. Instead,the legacy lies in the near-universal
perceptionthat human rightstreatiesare inherentlycontroversial.As one
respondentexpressed it, what is "importantis the perceptionof a given
treaty . . . everything gets categorized." Anything associated with human

rightsis viewed as "notimmediate,apparentlycontroversial,so we can push
itaside."Anotherstaffmemberindicatedthat"itwas the BrickerAmendment
controversy,and the incredibleknock-downdrag-outfightthat Eisenhower
had in fightingthat off, that I thinkformeda lot of the basic background."
What would it take to overcome this legacy?Respondentswere asked
to rankfive factorsaccordingto their importancein explainingthe current
situationof the human rightstreaties.Accordingto Table 3, the most im72. Ibid.,105, 108.
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TABLE
Rankingsof FactorsInhibitingPassageof HumanRightsTreaties,
Basedon Interviewswith SenateStaff, 1984
StaffMembers
Factor
Supportof Administration
InternalSenate Politics
PublicOpinion
Contentof Treaties
Situation
CurrentInternational

Republican Democratic
(n= 3)
(n= 7)
1.9*
2.3
3.6
3.3
4.0

2.0
3.0
1.3
4.7
4.0

All
(n= 10)
1.9
2.5
2.9
3.7
4.0

*Figuresare the averageranking(out of a possible5) given to this factorby each categoryof
staff.

particularly
portantfactorwas the positionof the president.Respondents,
perceivedthatthe lackof intereston the partof
respondents,
Republican
factorin explainingwhy
wasthe mostimportant
the Reaganadministration
much
less
to
had
no
the Senate
approve,thetreaties.Presiplans consider,
dentialsupportwas viewed as an essentialingredientfor passage:"the
administration
hasto be mobilizedforthe Congressto be mobilized;""the
Presidentwould have to be behindthem;""a strongpresidencyto twist
armsis the onlyway for [humanrights]treatiesto get through."
whichdidsign
to the Carteradministration,
oftenreferred
Respondents
their
threehumanrightstreatiesandformally
supported passageintheSenate.
TheCarteradministration's
supportof the humanrightstreaties,however,
eventuallybecamesecondaryto thesupportof othertreaties:"thePresident
only has so manycardsto play, and Carterwas sidetrackedby Panama
CanalandSALT
II."Inanycase,a decisiontotakeanactiveroleinadvocating
humanrightstreatiesis a difficultone to make,in lightof the perceived
meagerpoliticalbenefits.Advocatingthe treatieswould be "politically
"theessentialelement[inhibiting
passage]
costly"withouttangiblerewards:
... peoplecannotsee a directlinkbetween
is a lackof politicalconstituency
the treatiesandtheiroverallinterest."
Debateoverthe GenocideTreatyin 1984, whichoccurredsubsequent
to the completionof the interviews,
certainlysupportsthisview of the role
of theexecutivebranchin promoting
of humanrightstreaties.
consideration
of
endorsement
the
Genocide
President
unexpected
Treatyresulted
Reagan's
TheSenateForeignRelations
inthealmostimmediate
Senateconsideration.
Committee's
passageof the treatyoccurredjusta few weekslater,despite
universalpessimismon the partof Senatestaffearlierthatyear.
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A second general conclusion supportedby Table 3 is that the actual
contentof the treatiesis notviewed as the primarydeterminantof the current
situation.Perceptionis important,notcontent.Ingeneral,staffmembershad
not read any of the treatiesand were unfamiliarwith their content and
objectives. They were, on the other hand, very clear about the expected
responseof opponentswithinand behindthe Senate.Reactionsto the treaties
were based on their perceivedcontroversiality,the absence of a largeand
powerfulsupportingconstituency,and the lack of active presidentialsupon the provisionsof the documents.Inmattersof greatcontroversy
port--not
and
small tangible return,proponentsof the treatiesgenerallypreferredto
remaininactiveratherthanto commitscarce resourcesof time, favors,and
energy.
CONCLUSION
Inthis articlewe have analyzedthe earlyoppositionto humanrightstreaties
in the United States Senate and the residualeffect of this opposition on
contemporaryconsiderationof the treaties.We have documentedthat opposition to human rightstreatieswas central in the movementduringthe
1950s to amend the treatyprovisionsof the Constitution.Duringthe effort
to pass the BrickerAmendment,argumentsagainst human rightstreaties
were elaborated in their fullest form and were given national attention.
Becauseof the stronghistoricalsupportof the UnitedStatesfor humanrights
treaties,and the leadingrole this countryplayedin draftingthem, manyhad
assumedthat the questionbeforethe Senatewould be "Whynot ratifythe
treaties?"The hearingson the BrickerAmendmenteffectivelyturnedthat
questionaround.Proponentsof the treatieswere puton the defensive,having
to answera host of legal and politicalcriticisms.Bythe end of the hearings,
these argumentshad crystallizedinto a set of objectionswhich, based on
our analysis of the stabilityof argumentsover time, appearedessentially
unchangedin the 1979 hearingsand which are still being cited today.
These long-standingobjections are not easily overcome-fears once
raisedare not easily laid to rest.The recentexperienceof the ABAprovides
a good illustration.Althoughvery successful in the 1950s in dramatizing
what they perceivedto be the dangersof the treaties,the ABAin the mid1970s reversedits position on all of the human rightstreatiescovered in
this study and recommendedSenate approvalwith reservations.3"
Yetthe
73. The ABAapprovedthe Supplementary
SlaveryConventionin 1967; the GenocideConin 1976; the RacialDiscriminationTreaty(with
vention (with specified understandings)
in
reservations)in 1978; the AmericanConventionon HumanRights(withreservations)
in 1979.
1979; and both Covenantson HumanRights(withreservations)

1988

Amendment
Bricker
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TheABA's
Senateattention.
treatiesstillhavenotreceivedsustained
currently
activecampaignin supportof thetreaties-to persuadethe Senatethatthe
inherentin the treatieshavenow disappeared-willcertainlybe
"dangers"
a difficulttask,giventhe legacyof theiroriginalnegativecampaignwhich
fordecadesof opposition.
providedthe underpinning
Thearguments
of the 1950sfosteredthe perceptionthathumanrights
Thesearguments
andpotentially
treatieswerecontroversial
apdangerous.
in
domestic
United
States
and
changes
widespread
peartodaydespitedeep
law on humanrightsandthe ascendancyof humanrightsin regionaland
UnitedStatesinactionon humanrightstreaties
fora.Continued
international
remains
confusesmostof ourcitizensandmanyof ourallies.Yetratification
human
Bricker
to
of
Senator
The
rights
"bury"
unlikely. personalcampaign
treatiescontinuedas late as 1971, when he wroteto the SenateForeign
"I
Committee
Relations
duringtheirhearingson the GenocideConvention:
of the UnitedStates
do notwantto liveto see the daythatthe Constitution
and the Billof Rightsbecomesa merescrapof paper,and this treaty,if
The legacyof the
ratified,would be the beginningof such a process."74
BrickerAmendmentappearsto be continuedoppositionto humanrights
treaties,continuedneglectof themby the UnitedStatesSenate,andconburialtactics.
tinuedevidenceof the successof SenatorBricker's
APPENDIX
OF HUMANRIGHTS
AGAINSTU.S. RATIFICATION
ARGUMENTS
TREATIES
1. DIMINISHBASICRIGHTS:Humanrightstreatiesreflecta lower standardthan is currentlyguaranteed;they will take away U.S. rightsand
protection.
1a. endangerthe Bill of Rights
lb. constitutean attackon the concept of inalienablerights
1c. deprive U.S. citizens of freedomof assembly
1d. deprive U.S. citizens of freedomof religion
le. deprive U.S. citizens of freedomof the press
if. deprive U.S. citizens of freedomof speech
1g. deprive U.S. citizens of the rightof privateproperty
1h. deprive U.S. citizens of the rightto privatemedical care and to

operateprivatemedicalpractice

74. U.S. Congress.Senate.Committeeon ForeignRelations.Subcommitteeon the Genocide
Convention.Hearingson the Genocide Convention.92nd Cong., 1st sess., 1971. 13739.
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2. VIOLATE
HumanrightstreatiesviolateConstitutional
RIGHTS:
STATES'
protectionof states'rights.Theywill give the Federalgovernmentpowers meantto be retainedby the states.
2a. land ownershipby aliens may be allowed
2b. professionalmedical and bar practiceby aliens may be allowed
2c. there is no federal-stateprovisionin the treaties
2d. racialmatters
2e. otherstates'rights
3. PROMOTE
WORLDGOVERNMENT:
Humanrightstreatiesare being
used to move towardworld government.
3a. open us up to criticismin internationalfora
3b. requireus to impose internationalstandards,which would constitutean erosion of sovereignty
3c. subordinateus to foreignpowers
4. ENHANCE
INFLUENCE:
Humanrightstreaties
SOVIET/COMMUNIST
fostercommunism,soviet policies, and socialist rights.
4a. Human rightstreatiesare a partof the Communisteffortto take
over the world.
4b. specific mentionof the Soviet Union
4c. contain socialist rights, includingeconomic, social and cultural
rights
4d. obligate governmentsto provideprivatesector services as public
sector rights(food, shelter,clothing)
4e. challenge the free enterprisesystem (rightto strike,form trade
unions)
4f. anti-ILO
5. SUBJECT
CITIZENS
ABROAD:
TO TRIAL
5a. depriveUS citizens rightto trialby jury
5b. anti-international
criminalcourt
6. THREATEN
OUR FORMOF GOVERNMENT:
Human rightstreaties
will erode fundamentalgovernmentalpowers.
6a. The FoundingFatherswould not approve
6b. increasepower of the presidentat the expense of Congress
6c. resultin loss of controlover immigration
6d. give presidentnew power to seize property
7. INFRINGE
ON DOMESTIC
HumanrightstreatiesconJURISDICTION:
tain subjectswhich infringeon domestic matters.

BrickerAmendment

1988
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Humanrightstrea8. INCREASE
INTERNATIONAL
ENTANGLEMENTS:
ties are the creationof the U.N. which is a suspect organizationand
will draw us into matterswhich should not concern us.
8a. Anti-U.N.
8b. Neo-isolationism
9. CREATE
Treatiesareself-executing.
SELF-EXECUTING
OBLIGATIONS:
9a. There is no non-self-executingprovisionin the treaties.
9b. Otherstatescan ratifywithoutthe treatiesbecomingdomesticlaw;
the U.S. cannot.
10. OTHER:
10a. Human rightstreatieswill underminethe ability of the U.N. to
do its majorjob of security.
10b. Humanrightstreatiescontainonly the rightswe alreadyhave and
provideno additionalprotectionsfor U.S. citizens.
10c. Expertssay that humanrightstreatiesshould not be ratified.
11. NEW1979 ARGUMENTS:
11a. Legitimateexpropriationof U.S. propertyabroad
11b. Diminishthe rightsof U.S. women

